EVIDENCE-PRODUCTION OF

PRIVILEGED SELECTIVE SERVICE FILES-

RIGHTS IN CONFLICT-United States

v. Baker, 416 F.2d 202 (9th

Cir. 1969).

Considerable controversy and dissatisfaction with the Selective Service System, stimulated in part by the conflict in Southeast Asia, has
caused many young men to resist induction in the federal courts. An
example of such resistance, United States v. Baker,' may prove to be a
springboard for protracted litigation of orders of induction. Having
been previously classified I-A by his local draft board, Baker was
ordered to report for induction in November, 1967. He refused to
comply with the order and was thereafter tried and convicted.2 Baker's
defense was based on the alleged invalidity of the order of call, proper
order being set forth in 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7.3
At an in camera hearing before the trial judge, Baker obtained the
names of six I-A registrants in his local board who were older than he
but not called. Since Baker was the youngest registrant called for induction during that month, he would not have been called if any of
these six registrants had been ordered to report. Manifestly, if the order
4
of call were improper, the notice of induction would have been invalid.
On defendant's direct examination, Colonel Neilson, a field attorney for Selective Service, testified to the fact that there were six
registrants apparently eligible for induction before defendant. Upon
cross-examination, Neilson stated that he had personally determined
that the reasons for by-passing these registrants were valid but that he
could not divulge any information contained in their files because it
was confidential and privileged by law. 5 Neilson was then asked to state
these reasons generally, without identifying the registrant. Baker objected, contending that Neilson's oral testimony was not the "best evidence" for establishing regularity of call and that only the written
1 416 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1969).
2 An unreported decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California.
332 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1969):
(a) ....
[R]egistrants . . . shall be selected and ordered to report for induction
in the following order: . . . (3) Nonvolunteers who have attained the age of 19
years and have no [sic] attained the age of 26 years . . . in the order of their
dates of birth with the oldest being selected first.
The new lottery system, which became effective on January 1, 1970, has revised the
above section whereby relative age is no longer a factor.
4 Baker expressly affirms the need for strict compliance with the prescribed order
of call. 416 F.2d at 205.
5 See 32 C.F.R. § 1606.31 (1969), as to confidential nature of Selective Service files.
See also 32 C.F.R. § 1606.35(b) (1969) as to restriction of testimony.
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records were competent for that purpose. The trial court never really
decided the objection. Rather, it observed that since there were "multitudinous possibilities" for deferment, it was unnecessary to pursue the
issue. There was no further attempt to justify the order of call.
On appeal, 6 the conviction was reversed. The majority held that,
although the court will presume regularity of order of call, where defendant has adduced evidence of apparent irregularity, the burden of
proving regularity will be placed on the Government. Since there was
no proof of regularity other than Neilson's oral testimony, the prosecution had not sustained its burden of proof. The Government argued
that since the lack of proof was an "invited error" occasioned by defendant's own objection, he should not be allowed to benefit from it.
Although the dissenting opinion agreed with the Government, the
majority dismissed the argument stating:
We have serious doubt that the court's observation, in effect a
ruling, was motivated by the objection. Rather, the record suggests
that the court held the mistaken view that a proper order of call
was not an essential element of the offense3
Although the need for regularity is not disputed there is some
dispute as to whether regularity must be pleaded affirmatively by the
Government. In Greer v. United States s the court held that the regularity of a local board's order need not be set out in the indictment.
The law will presume regularity unless the defendant chooses to plead
irregularity in his defense. Six months later, United States v. Lybrand9
held that the proper order of call is such an essential element of the
offense that it must be affirmatively pleaded by the prosecution. The
court was of the opinion that such a presumption may be unconstitutional, and it had "grave doubts" as to its propriety. However, the
better and more practical approach, followed in Yates v. United
States,10 Little v. United States," and Baker, requires that defendant
place in issue the regularity of call if he wishes to avail himself of that
12
defense.
6 United States v. Baker, 416 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1969).
7 Id. at 205.
8 378 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1967).
9 279 F. Supp. 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). But see United States v. Sandbank, 403 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1968).
10 404 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1968).
11 409 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1969).
12 Note that in this case, Baker did have actual evidence of an apparent irregularity.
Although regularity may be placed in issue without such evidence, the more firmly established rule in Government prosecutions is that the court will not divest the Government
of the right to have regularity presumed if all the defendant can show is mere disbelief
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Baker's primary significance is its holding that the defendant's objection to the oral testimony was well taken. The ruling was based on
the fact that no showing was made that the written records were unavailable. Without such showing, Neilson's oral testimony was incompetent. Furthermore, the court expressed doubt whether any court
would allow secondary evidence in this situation, even if waiver of
privilege could not be obtained. 13 Since the burden of proving regularity rested with the Government and could not be sustained without
producing the confidential files, their production became vitally important to the prosecution's success.
There would be no problem in satisfying this production requirement when the records sought are those of the defendant. The law
restricting production and privilege does not apply to a registrant who
is a party to litigation with the Government. 14 However, when the
crucial records are those of a registrant not involved in a government
prosecution, the law expressly prohibits production, unless the registrant
concerned or the State Director of Selective Service consents, in writing,
to a waiver of the privilege. 15
Although Baker is a case of first impression, several other cases
have indicated that investigation into collateral files is improper. In
affirming a conviction for refusing induction, the court in United States
v. Parker16 stated that the trial court "was [properly] confined to a review of Parker's file in deciding whether a basis in fact existed ....

It

was not to look for substantial evidence to support the determination
of the local or appeal board.' 1 7 This notion is derived from the rationale of Estep v. United States,' which held that the decisions of a
in the accuracy of the local board's decision. See United States v. Sandbank, 403 F.2d 38
(2d Cir. 1968).
13 416 F.2d at 206, n.2.
14 32 C.F.R. § 1606.34 (1969) provides for automatic waiver of privilege of all records
of any registrant who files a claim against the Government involving Selective Service
matters, and his records may be produced in response to a subpoena. 32 C.F.R. § 1606.35(a)
provides: "In the prosecution of a registrant . . .for a violation of the Military Selective
Service Act . . . or regulations . . . all records of the registrant shall be produced in
response to the subpena . . . of the court ...."
15 32 C.F.R. § 1606.35(b) (1969) provides: Except as provided in paragraph (a) of
this section, no officer or employee of the Selective Service shall produce a registrant's file ... or testify regarding any confidential information contained therein,
in response to a subpena . . . without the consent, in writing, of the registrant
concerned, or of the Director of Selective Service.
16 307 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1962).
17 Id. at 587; accord, United States v. Jackson, 359 F.2d 936, 938 (4th Cir. 1966).
1 327 U.S. 114 (1946). This case is the leading authority for the proposition that the
federal courts are not super draft boards who will substitute their judgment for that
of the local board. The courts will only sit to determine if the local board has acted
reasonably, with some factual basis for its decision.
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local board, made in conformity with regulations, will be deemed final,
even if erroneous, unless the court finds no "basis in fact" for the decision. Since the quantum of fact necessary to find that a "basis in fact"
existed can be obtained from the defendant's own file, the courts have
found it both unnecessary and improper to go beyond the defendant's
own case history in determining whether the local board acted reasonably. Thus, it would seem that Baker has gone beyond established
precedent by allowing investigation into collateral records to determine
validity of local board orders.' 9 Indeed, Baker would go so far as to
make these records essential to the proof of the indictment. It must be
noted, however, that the unique fact situation in Baker may have been
a factor in requiring production of non-party files. Clearly, if Baker
had access to no file other than his own, he would have had no chance
of success. Understandably, non-party registrants may be unwilling to
allow their personal files to be deposited in court to become part of a
public record. Since the statute governing privilege20 gives the registrant the right to waive his privacy, such refusal would seem to be a
proper exercise of that option. Further, the Director of Selective Service, who can also waive privilege, 2' may be reluctant to do so if the
registrant has no real interest in the litigation. Since the statute is designed to protect the privacy of the registrant and not the Director, the
collateral issue of whether the Director has the constitutional right to
disregard a registrant's express desire to refuse waiver may arise.
Since Baker requires production of collateral files, necessary to
rebut evidence of apparent irregularity, and the statute expressly prohibits production without consent, what happens if waiver is unobtainable? Must the Government's prosecution fail? That failure to produce
certain documents germane to the Government's case will force dismissal of a criminal prosecution is now an established principle in
federal courts. The leading case of Jencks v. United States22 involved
the production of confidential government evidence specifically gathered for Jencks' prosecution. The court's approbation of the Government's refusal to produce files containing statements of witnesses called
at trial was ruled reversible error. Thus, it is clear that the Government
may be forced to expose its files or drop criminal proceedings.
It must be noted, however, that Jencks and the legislation it en19 Little v. United States, 409 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1969); Yates v. United States, 404
F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1968); United States v. Lybrand, 279 F. Supp. 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); none
of the above cases contain language to support Baker's ruling.
20 32 C.F.R. § 1606.35(b) (1969).
21 32 C.F.R. § 1606.35(b) (1969).
22 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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gendered 28 pertain to government records gathered expressly for purposes of prosecution and is further limited to statements, written or
otherwise, made by witnesses who have testified as to their contents. In
Baker, the records in question are not of that nature and would appear
not to be within the purview of the statute. These records are confidential information gathered for purely administrative purposes and
24
only collaterally bear on the prosecution. Although Baker cites Jencks
as authority for requiring production, it would appear that the latter
is distinguishable and does not provide a basis for broadening the
production rule to an extent that may involve possible violation of a
25
personal, statutory right to privacy.

However, rigid protection of a non-party registrant's right to have
his files remain confidential could lead to frustration of a legitimate
prosecution, under the Baker rule. This situation could easily occur in
local board jurisdictions which cover large numbers of men. In such
jurisdictions, it is quite probable that some registrants who would
normally be called before others might not be called because of any
one of a number of legitimate reasons. Knowledge of this situation by
any registrant at or near the bottom of a monthly quota would be
sufficient evidence to force the Government to go to court to prove that
the order to report was valid; and this could only be done by producing these non-party files. Although the production requirement might

occasionally expose certain capricious and arbitrary action by a local
board, it could easily lead to unnecessary litigation and also prevent
properly founded prosecution.
It should be noted, however, that conflict between a defendant's
right to know the nature of the evidence against him and the right to
privacy of records only arises when the registrant challenging the action
of the local board has concrete evidence of some apparent irregularity.
If he has none, he may still place its validity in issue; but the regularity
of call may be easily established for the record by oral testimony of any
local board official, usually the clerk. Such testimony will ordinarily
meet the burden of proof without any further investigation. 26
By expanding the production requirement under the Jencks Act
23 Following the decision in Jencks, Congress enacted 71 Stat. 595, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1957), referred to as the Jencks Act. The Act provides for compulsory production of all
recorded statements made by witnesses who have testified against the defendant. If the
Government refuses to produce the statements for defendant's examination, the testimony
will be stricken.
24 416 F.2d at 206, n.2.
25 32 C.F.R. § 1606.31 (1969).
26 See Yates v. United States, 404 F.2d 462, 466 (1st Cir. 1968).
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to include confidential files of non-party registrants, Baker may have
opened Pandora's Box. The dissenting opinion, recognizing that the
majority had expressed a novel view, would not go so far as to force
confrontation between the Department of Justice and the statutes controlling Selective Service files.
Safeguarding a registrant's privacy and insuring freedom from discriminatory practices of local draft boards are noble goals not to be
taken lightly; thus, one goal should not be sacrificed for the other. But
if organizations as complex and vital as the Selective Service and the
Department of Justice are to function effectively, they must be free
from unnecessary vexation. In an attempt to balance justice, privacy,
and practicality in criminal prosecutions of draft violators, Baker may
have tipped the scales too much in one direction.

